This paper develops the classical view of the extent of markets by introducing explicitly in the analysis the concept of arbitrage costs.
I. Introduction.
Since Coase's (1937) seminal article on the "Nature of the Firm", transaction costs have been used widely to analyze economic and social institutions. Recently. transaction costs have also been used to explain the development of markets. 1 The purpose of this paper is to expand this line of research by using transaction costs explicitly in defining markets.
Our approach develops the classical view of markets. 2 Classical economists saw a market as that set of producers and buyers whose prices tend towards uniformity.3 That set of agents is a distinct one. The interrelation in their prices is different from that with the rest of the economy. In the classists' framework transaction costs define the boundary of the "market" for each commodity.4
Price uniformity h3S recently r~ceived much attention in delineating markets (Stigler and Sherwin (1983) , Horowitz(1972».5 These papers define 'See Telser and Higinbotham (1977) and Carlton (1983) for an application to the development of futures markets. See Clark (1984) for an analysis of the working of the gold standard with a detailed analysis of transaction costs.
2The classicists used transaction costs explici tly in defining and analyzing the developments_of markets. See for example Marshall (1936, p.112 and pp.323-330 ).
3Cournot's definition of a market is as that "entire territory of which the parts are so united by the relations of unrestricted CODnerce that prices there take the same level throughout, wi th ease and rapidi ty" (Cournot (1960, pp.51-52, fn.) . This view of a market is also shared by Stigler (1966, pp.85-86) . 4 In what follows we will use the terms transaction or arbitrage costs interchangeably.
5For a collection of many of the papers addressing the defini tion of markets (mostly in relation to antitrust) see Elzinga and Rogowsky(1984) . Scheffman and Spiller (1984) discuss the difference between 'antitrust' and (Footnote continued) markets by including in a market that set of transactions that show a high degree of price correlation. 6
We argue in this paper that markets' boundaries are essentially stochastic, that the agents (regions, products) that may belong to a "market" at one point in time may not in another, and consequently, that price correlations are not sufficient statistics to characterize which agents (regions, products) may potentially belong to a market. Moreover, we show that in determining the market for a commodity, agents (regions or products) have to be characterized by their arbitrage (transaction) costs and by the probability that their prices will be bound by binding arbitrage conditions (Le. will show price uniformity). Moreover, we develop a methodology that characterizes agents (regions, products) by those two characteristics. Finally, we implement it to wholesale (termin3l) gasoline markets in the northeastern part of the United States.
II. Transaction Costs and Markets.
Assume th~t the cost of shipping a certain good between two cities is c. It is then clear that the prices in the two cities cannot differ by more than c. If they had, traders could, without any risk, have made a profit by buying in one and selling in the other. Those prices could, however, differ by less than c. In such a Circumstance, no profitable 5(continued) 'economic' markets.
In this paper we do not claim that our methodology defines antitrust markets. We claim it to be useful, however, in delineating what classical economists called 'economic markets'.
6A more stringent cri teria reqUIring the prices of the different commodi ties to be included in a market to have the S3me statistical information is presented in Gelfand and Spiller(1984) .
arbitrage opportunities arise and price movements in the two cities need not be uniform. That is, at that time the two cities would not be in the same market.
A marginal increase in the price in one ci ty would not directly affect the price of the good in the other. Let the price increase, however, be larger, and the two cities could become a single market: their prices would be uniform and differ by c.
Thus, the composition of markets changes over time as the underlying supply and demand variables evolve. When saying that a given set of traders are in the same "market", we must also clarify how often they are. That is, how often are their prices uniform. There is, then, no way we can exhaustively define a market. We can only determine, for a given set of agents, the transaction costs that are required to arbitrage among the members of that set, and, also, ho~ often the arbitrage conditions among them are binding.7 Moreover, it is difficult to envision a set of agents wi th binding arbi trage condi tions at all times. Thus, while Cheung (1983.p.3) argues, "we do not exactly know what the firm Is -nor is it vital to know," we have to recognize that the same goes for "markets". We can know, however, whether a set of agents are at a given pOint in time bound by binding arbitrage conditions. We cannot say, however, that they form a market, since they may not be bound by binding arbitrage conditions at some other time. Markets' boundaries are, then, stochastic. Whether a given set of agents will belong to the same market in the future is 7Arbitrage (transaction) costs do not need to be only "direct shipping" costs. They also include information costs, all those "costs" generated by governmental policies (e.g. legal maximum or minimum prices, taxes, quotas) and thei r enforcement as well as any hedging costs required to make arbitrage a no risk activity. Clark (198~) Let us provide an example from regional trade. Figure 1 depicts the autarky equilibrium for two regions. Call Pt and p~ the autarky prices.
[Insert Figure 1 approximately here]
If the transportation costs from region 1 to 2 exceed P~-pt, then no trade will take place and we may say that the two regions are not in the 8 same market. Let, however, the transportation costs be given by To<p~_pt, then observed equilibrium prices in the two regions will be given by p 2&P, +TO, region 1 wi 11 export X 1 units of the commodi ty, and the two regions will be in the same market. Observe that if transportation costs exceed P~-pt then the observed equilibri~m prices are the autarky prices.
and thus P, and P2 are independent. An increase in the autarky price of one region should not affect the observed equilibrium price in the other (unless the autarky price difference exceeds the transaction cost).
Ho~ever, if P~-pt exceeds the transaction costs then the two equilibrium prices are interrelated. A shock in one region translates into the other (unless the autarky price difference falls below the transaction cost).
If the underlying demand and supply functions are subject to stochastic shocks. some times the observed equilibrium prices will differ by the transportation costs, and some other times by less. Thus the probability 8we use the term autarky prices as those prices that would prevail if no trade whatsoever is feaSible, either because of a binding legal rule or because of some infinitely high transportation cost. of two regions belonging to the same market is a function of the transaction costs between the two regions and of the variances of the underlying demand and supply functions. Moreover, this probability is a measure of integration. The higher the probability, the more integrated the regions are.
The next section develops a methodology to estimate the probability of arbitrage for a given pair of regions.
III • Tbe Model.
Consider two separate regions: 1 and 2. In the presence of legal trading barriers the autarky equilibrium prices (p£A,Pr A ) at time t would be determined by demand and supply factors in each region. For simplicity, the reduced form equations of autarky prices are assumed to have constant means, ( , a) ( 1 b) where the random error term E€ represents shocks to the markets in each region. In the absence of legal trading barriers but with finite transaction costs, the observed prices (P£. P r ) may diverge from the autarky prices. Denote the transaction costs in each period by T t .9Then, if the autarky prices differ by less than T t , no a:'bitrage opportunities arise and the observed prices are in fact the autarky prices.
9For simplicity, let transaction costs be the same in both directions of trade.
-8-For simplicity of discussion assume that p~A > p~A. Then if
On the other hand, if the autarky prices differ by no less than T t , arbitrage opportunities arise and the observed prices will diverge from the autarky prices in such a way that the observed equilibrium prices in the two regions differ only by the transaction costs. That is, if we have (5 ) Ass~~e that the transaction costs at period t, T t , is a random variable with a geometric mean T, i.e., where V t is normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance o~.
The probability of no arbitrage "opportunities and hence the probability of observing (3), is a constant A -9-
The constant>. is of course a function of ~i, T, o~ and the distribution parameters of the random variables ct in (1). The probability of arbitrage and hence the probability of observing (5) is (1->').
Define a positive random variable U t , and B = log T. It can be seen that the observed price equations in (3) and (5) with probability (1->'). Equation (7) corresponds to the regime of no arbitrage opportunities or the autarky state and (8) corresponds to the arbitrage state.
Equation (7) is in fact a composite error regression with a positive component U t • The regression (7) corresponds to the standard stochastic frontier equation defined and analyzed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt [1977] . While the parameter>. measures the probability of being in the autarky (no trade) state, the positive error U t is a conditional measure of propensity to trade. Given that a particular period t is at the autarky state, the smaller the positive value of U t , the higher the propensity to trade. In this paper, the positive random error component U t is assumed to be distributed independently of V t with a one-sided half-normal distribution, i.e., the distribution is derived from a normal distribution N(O,oa) truncated from below at zero. Denote 6 • (B, o~, o~. A) as the parameter vector for the regressions (7) and (8), then the likelihood function for the n observation is given by:
where fl and f€ are the density functions of (7) and (8) respectively.
Define Y t = log (Pt -P t ), the density functions are
<P ( °v °v where <p and ~ are the standard normal density and distribution functions respectively (see Aigner et al [1977] for a derivation of (10».
The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters e can be obtained by maximizing the logarithmic function of (9). However, following Kiefer [1930] it is interesting to observe that the probability parameter A Is obtained by solving
Defining (13) the solution for A in (12) can be shown to be the average of w t
The variable W t in (13) is the weight of the likelihood component of being in the autarky state. The weight W t is then in fact the posterior probability of being in the autarky state condit1onal on the observation
The maximum likelihood estimate of the probability parameter A is nothing but the sample average of the posterior probabilities of autarky.
IV. An ApplIcation to Wholesale Gasoline Markets.
Iv.a. The Data. Gasoline flows to the northeast mainly through two ways. One is through pipelines that bring gasoline from the Gulf Coast area and whose northernmost point is Newark, New Jersey. 11 Another is through waterborne cargoes. Gasoline imports as well as Gulf Coast gasoline are delivered to each of the seaport cities through barges or tanker shipments. Gasoline 10The common wisdom among industry analysts is that the prices quoted by the majors at terminal locations are not necessarily those actually charged. Thus by choosing the lowest price available we may eliminate the difference between posted and transaction prices. Contract jobbers or independent jobbers are the "explici til purchasers of the terminaling product. Shipments to own retailers, on the other hand, are "implicit" wholesale sales. These should, therefore, compete with those "explicit" transactions.
Arbitrage among the different cities 12 is performed in two different ways. First, water cargoes that were directed originally to one city can be diverted, at a cost, to some other city whose expected price (in the absence of arbitrage) may have increased. Alternatively, actual intercity barge shipments may take place. Since Newark, New Jersey, is the place where the Colonial Pipeline ends, it would naturally become a central distribution place for the northeast.
Tha tis, gasoli ne to, say Providence, may be delivered from the Gulf in two ways: it may be sent directly by tanker, or, alternatively, through the Pipeline to Newark and from it, by barges, to its final destination. Thus Newark will usually have the lowest price, and its price should be expected to limit the other cities' prices. 1 3 That is, the price, say, in Providence cannot exceed the price in Newark by more than the cost of shipping gasoline from Newark to 12The discussion until now was based on the existence of only two cities (or regions). The question that can arise is whether the existence of, say, a third city could not change the direction of arbitrage. Assume the autarky prices of cities 1 and 2 differ by more than the transaction cost between the two cities so as that arbitrage should be performed from ci ty 1 to city 2.
Assume furt her tha t there i 3 one ot her city whos e autarky price could also be such as to create arbitrage opportunities with some of the other two cities. Clark (1934) has shown that if direct arbitrage between two cities is cheaper than indirect one, then city 1 should be "exporting" while city 2 should be "importing" the good. That i3 not to say, however, that city 2's imports will come from city l's exports.
130uring the whole period of analysts Newark's price was the lowest quoted price among the five cities we consider here.
Providence. The price in Providence, moreover, will also be bound by the prices in surrounding cities (Boston and Portland, Maine). Thus, arbitrage can occur between any pair of ci ties. We would expect, however, that arbitrage occurs more often among cities that are geographically closer.
That is, because of their proximity, we would expect New York and Newark, on the one hand, and Boston, Portland (Maine) and Providence, on the other, to be highly integrated. Table 1 presents the correlation matrix for the five cities' prices, both in levels and first differences. In levelS, all prices are highly correlated (as we would expect).
In first differences, however, price correlations are relatively low.
The lowest correlations are between
Providence and Portland, New York and Portland and Newark and Providence.
Our previous discussion suggests, however, that price correlations are not the proper statistic to infer whether two regions are usually in the same market: first, transaction costs may differ depending on the direction of arbitrage; second, the correlation of prices when not subject to binding arbitrage conditions is spurious (i.e. the result of common movements in the determinants of local supply and demand conditions), thus polluting the statistic. In what follows we find that our results provide substantially different implications than those of simple correlation coefficients.
[Insert Table 1 Approximately here]
IV.b. The Estlaatlon.
We estimated for each city pair the model given by (9)-{ll}.14 Since Y t is not defined for pr-pt<o. the estimation had to be performed in two directions. That is. for each city pair we divided the sample in two. One group was comprised of all the observations for which the price in one of the two ci ties was the higher one. The other group comprised those observations for which the other ci ty' s price was higher. 15 Each set represents all the instances where arbitrage would have been performed from the ci ty wi th the lower price to that wi th the higher (see equations (2) Observe that T t in (2) reflects real transaction costs. Thus t~ estimate the model we first have to defTare all our price series by a prlce index. We chose to deflate the series by the Wholesale Price index. Since it is reported monthly. we gave the same index number to each week of a month. Since during the period wholesale prices were relatively stable. we estimated the model also without deflating the price series. The results were essentially unchanged and thus are not reported. They are available upon request.
15 Seldom were the prices in two cities the same. These observations had to be discarded.
16 In the estimation it will be assumed that arbitrage costs in each direction are different. That is. the stochastic processes generating them are not assumed to be the same. Consequently. we estimate the model in two parts, one for each direction. [Insert Table 2 approximately here] Table 2 presents the maximum likelihood estimates (and their asymptotic t-statistics) of the four parameters of the model (i.e. the logarithm of the transaction costs, the variances of U and V, and the probability of not being bound by binding arbitrage conditions). This Table provides some interesting results. First, city-pairs with high probability of being in the same market (low ).' s) seem to be those that are close-by: New York-Newark (1-).=.80), Portland-Boston (1-),=.78), Portland-Providence (1-).-.85), Providence-Boston (1-).a.85), and Providence-Newark (1-).a.82).18
On the other hand, distant City-pairs seem to be less likely to be in the same market (high ).'s): Boston-Newark (1-).-.68), New York-Boston (1-).a.59), New York-Portland (1->'''.34), and Portland-Newark (1->'=.70). Also, city pairs requiring arbitrage in a north-south direction seem to have lower probabili ties of being in the same market than ci ty pairs requiring arbitrage in the opposite direction. 19 The average probability of being in 17we estimated the model only for those cases in which the price in one city exceeded the other city's price in at least 50 weeks.
18The order of the cities is important. The second city is the one from which arbitrage would have taken place (i.e. the one with the lower autarky price). Thus New York-Newark refers to those observations for which the price in New York was higher than that in Newark. For those cases, 80% of the times we would expect Newark to limit New York's price by binding arbitrage.
19rn circumstances where there are· only two locations and where shipments are evenly distributed in each direction, this feature of the market would not develop. In our case, however. shipments are multilateral (Footnote continued) the same market for the former type of city pairs is .45, compared with .81
for the latter. (Observe, however, that Boston-Providence has a high probability of being in the same market (.85) even when it is a North to South city pair.) Moreover, except for New York-Newark,20 city-pairs with low transaction costs have also relatively high probabilities of being in the same market. 21 Furthermore, and perhaps not surprisingly, indirect arbitrage is more expensive th~n direct one. 22 That is, if arbitrage from Newark to Portland is worth undertaking, it will be cheaper to ship the product directly rather than first shipping it, say, to Boston and from it to portland.
Finally, Newark's price is found to bound all other cities' prices by binding arbi trage condi tlons most of the times. Thus Newark is almost always a relevant player in gasoline markets in the other cities. Boston is also an active player in Providence and Portland, while Providence is active only in Portland's market. Portland, however, is not very active in 19(continued) and there is a normal south-north flow pattern. Thus, its appearance is understandable. A similar conclusion, albei t wi th a very different methodology and data set, was obtained by Slade(1983) .
20New York had the highest average terminal gasoline price of the five ci ties. Since the Oil Price Information Service assured us in private communication that their reported prices do not include taxes in any of the cities we are considering here, the reason is unclear. Our estimates of transaction costs for arbitrage going to New York are the highest among all City-pairs. Nevertheless, Newark and New York are almost always bound by binding arbitrage conditions.
21 From the defini tion of >. in equation (5), i t can be seen that, ceteris paribus, the higher T the higher >.. In our calculations, however, a high >. may occur because of relatively low variances in the local (autarkic) demand and supply shocks, and therefore may not imply a high T. 22Th' , t i ' f 1S 1S he assumpt on requ1red to be able to per orm City-pair wise comparisons. See Clark(1984) and footnote 14 above. any market.
[Insert Table 3 Approximately Here]
While the results of the estimation are plausi ble, it is proper to inquire about the ability of the model to discriminate between regimes.
That is, given the ex-ante probability of two cities belonging to the same market, we would like the model to be able to separate, for a given city pair, the observations in two distinct groups: one wi th very low probabilities of being under bindin~ arbitrage conditions, and another with high probabilities. In (13), W t is the posterior probability, given the actual price differentials, of observation t being in the autarky state. We can then classify observations by their W t • This is done in Table 3 . Table 3 shows the frequency distribution -over the sample-of the posterior probability, given the actual prices, of two cities not belonging to the same market. We observe from Table 3 that for most ca~es the model discriminates between regimes quite well: the posterior probabilities are clustered near zero or near one. That is, for most observations the probabil i ty of an observation belonging to the autarky state is ei ther below 20% or above 80S. Rarely it is in the probability interval 40 to 60S.
v. Final Comments.
We developed in this paper a methodology to estimate the transaction costs required to arbitrage among a given set of products, as well as the frequency of their being bound by bind~ng arbitrage condi tions.
The methodology implies the estimation of a swi tching regimes model. One regime is characterized by the prices between the two products differing by the arbitrage (or transaction) costs. In other, when there is no (explicit or implicit) arbitrage between the two products, their prices differ by less than the transaction costs. This regime is statistically identified by a truncation 1n its error structure, similarl to the stochastic frontier models estimated elsewhere in the literature. We applied the methodology to wholesale (terminal) gasoline in the Northeastern part of the United States. Our main findings are as follows: First, the model was able to discriminate qui te well between regimes, thus suggesting that our methodology could be useful in other applications. Second, the results are qui te intui ti ve: close-by ci ties are more integrated than further-away cities; city-pairs with higher transaction costs are less integrated than those with smaller transaction costs; arbitrage costs increase with the distance between the cities. Also, arbitrage costs, and thus the extent of integration, depend on the direction of arbitrage.
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